Minnesota Business Corporations Act: Greater Freedom for Corporations by Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
1982
Minnesota Business Corporations Act: Greater
Freedom for Corporations
Minn. L. Rev. Editorial Board
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Editorial Board, Minn. L. Rev., "Minnesota Business Corporations Act: Greater Freedom for Corporations" (1982). Minnesota Law
Review. 3174.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/3174
Notes
Minnesota Business Corporations Act: Greater
Freedom for Corporations
I. INTRODUCTION
The new Minnesota Business Corporations Act' (new Act)
modernizes Minnesota law to meet the needs of contemporary
local businesses. The prior law, 2 the second oldest body of
state business corporation law in the nation,3 was inflexible,
confusing, and unresponsive to the needs of modem busi-
nesses.4 For example, although closely-held businesses com-
prise ninety percent of the business corporations in
Minnesota,5 prior law made no distinction between publicly-
owned and closely-held businesses. The old law mandated pro-
cedures and requirements that reflected archaic notions of op-
erating publicly-owned businesses, and ignored the special
needs of closely-held corporations. These outmoded proce-
dures and requirements prohibited shareholders and corporate
managers from adopting contemporary business practices. In
addition, because prior law often forced new business corpora-
tions to incur high legal costs during their formation,6 many
businesses either did not incorporate or feigned compliance
with the statutory requirements.7
In response to these deficiencies, the Minnesota Advisory
Task Force on Corporation Law8 drafted Chapter 302A. The
1. Act of May 27, 1981, ch. 270, 1981 Minn. Laws 1141 (codified at MIEN.
STAT. §§ 302A.001-.917 (Supp. 1981)).
2. MINN. STAT. §§ 300.01-.84, 301.01-.98 (1980).
3. See REPORT TO THE SENATE BY THE ADVISORY TASK FORCE ON CORPORA-
TION LAw (1980), reprinted in MIN. STAT. ANN. ch. 302A, at VII (West Supp.
1982) [hereinafter cited as ADViSORY Comm. REP.]. For example, prior law gen-
erally ignored the development of federal and state securities laws and rules.
Id at X.
4. See ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 3, at IX.
5. See ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 3, at VIIM
6. See ADVISORY COMM. REP., supra note 3, at IX-X.
7. For example, formalities such as annual shareholders' meetings, see
MINN. STAT. § 301.25(2) (1980), forced small firms with only one or two share-
holders to go to the expense and bother of holding meetings and keeping
records or faking compliance with the statute.
8. See ADVISORY Cou. REP., supra note 3, at VIL:
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proposed Act was signed into law on May 27, 1981, and became
effective on July 1, 1981. 9 By January 1, 1984, Chapter 302A will
govern the activities of almost all businesses incorporated in
Minnesota.l0
Chapter 302A attempts to encourage the formation of new
business corporations within the state by providing "the great-
est degree of flexibility and the most clear cut recognition of
contemporary business needs and practices."" In addition,
Chapter 302A revises the rules governing corporate formation,
governance, and dissolution to make them more consistent
with contemporary business practices. For example, the new
Act eliminates many needless and potentially expensive for-
malities. New corporations need no longer file long and intri-
cate articles of incorporation. Chapter 302A only requires the
articles to contain the name and address of the corporation, the
name of its registered agent, the number of shares available for
issuance, and the names and addresses of the incorporators. 12
The new Act also provides a checklist of provisions that the in-
corporators may desire to include in the articles of incorpora-
tion, thus saving many small businesses the unnecessary
The Advisory Task Force on Minnesota Corporation Law was formed
because of a mounting concern that the corporation laws governing
Minnesota business corporations are technically and substantively de-
ficient, out of date, and a source of confusion and frustration in the
modern business world for shareholders, directors, officers, creditors,
governmental agencies, lawyers, and the courts.
Id. The Task Force was composed of thirteen attorneys, aided by one ful-time
staff member, several part-time research assistants, several members of the
Minnesota Bar, and the comments and criticism of practitioners and professors
across the nation. See id. at V-VII.
9. INN. STAT. § 302A.021(2) (Supp. 1981).
10. Minnesota corporations prior to the enactment of Chapter 302A were
governed by either Minnesota Statutes Chapter 301, which originated in 1933
Minn. Laws, ch. 300, or Chapter 300, which originated in 1858 Minn. Laws, ch. 55.
The 1933 Act permitted businesses incorporated under Chapter 300 to elect to
remain under Chapter 300. Id. § 301.60 (1980). The drafters of the 1981 Act
doubted whether Chapter 300 corporations that never became governed by
Chapter 301 could be forced to accept Chapter 302A, since Chapter 300 con-
tained no reservation of power to subject corporations formed thereunder to fu-
ture amendments. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.021 reporter's notes (West Supp.
1982). The new Act thus exempts Chapter 300 corporations from its application.
All other Minnesota corporations may elect to come under Chapter 302A until
January 1, 1984, when non-electing corporations become subject to the new law.
MIN. STAT. § 302A.021(7) (Supp. 1981).
11. ADVISORY Comm. REP., supra note 3, at X,
12. MINN. STAT. § 302A.111(1) (Supp. 1981). In contrast, prior law required
a statement of business purpose or purposes, the duration of the business, a
description of each class of stock, and the minimum amount of stated capital
with which the corporation begins business. Id. § 301.04 (1980).
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expense of hiring counsel.'3
Chapter 302A facilitates the governance of both closely-
held and publicly-held businesses by granting the board of di-
rectors broad discretion in corporate management.' 4 The au-
thority of the board of directors may now be vested in
executive or other committees of the board.15 The new Act
modifies the directors' statutory duty of care by allowing them
to rely upon the information and advice of officers or employ-
ees believed to be "reliable and competent"; directors can also
rely on counsel, public accountants, and others who have perti-
nent "professional or expert competence."16 In addition, Chap-
ter 302A allows directors to conduct the business without
holding meetings; if the articles so authorize, the board may act
on the written authorization of its members.' 7
The new Act also allows shareholders to assume responsi-
bilities for corporate management. Upon unanimous vote, the
shareholders may undertake the function of the board of direc-
tors.' 8 This provision allows a sole shareholder to directly
manage the corporation. 9 Moreover, shareholder groups may
13. Id. § 302A.111(2)-(4) (Supp. 1981). The checklist specifies the required
provisions for the articles. Id. § 302A.111(1). In addition, the checklist enumer-
ates all of the provisions of Chapter 302A that govern a corporation unless mod-
ified by the articles, id. § 302A.111(2), lists provisions of the law governing a
corporation that the articles or bylaws may modify, id. § 302A.111(3), and lists
those provisions of the law relating to the management and regulation of the
corporation not otherwise applicable to the corporation that the articles or by-
laws may include. Id. § 302A.111 (4). The net effect of the checklist is to provide
shareholders, subscribers, and incorporators a greater "opportunity to influ-
ence the future of the corporation." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.111 reporter's
notes (West Supp. 1982).
14. ADVIsoRY Comi. REP., supra note 3, at X1H.
15. MmN. STAT. § 302A.241(1) (Supp. 1981). The former law only permitted
the board to appoint an executive committee. Id. § 301.28 (1980). Under Chap-
ter 302A, the board may delegate any part of its power of management to any
committee of its choosing, while retaining the ultimate power over that commit-
tee. Id. § 302A.241(1) (Supp. 1981). The committee of disinterested persons
under section 302A.243 represents the one exception to this provision. Id.
§§ 302A.241(1), .243. See also infra notes 125-83 and accompanying text.
16. MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(2) (a) (Supp. 1981). This "safe harbor" provision
recognizes that a director of a modern corporation may not be able to person-
ally discover and collect all of the necessary facts to discharge his or her duties:
MiN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.251 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982). A director's ac-
tions are protected only if the director actually relied upon the information, and
the information relied upon was within the field of the expert's competence.
Id.
17. MINN. STAT. § 302A.239(1) (Supp. 1981).
18. Id. §302A.201(2).
19. The new Act also allows a sole shareholder to be the only director of
the corporation. Id. § 302A.203. A sole shareholder who is a natural person
could also directly manage the corporation by becoming the sole director. Id.
19821 1035
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
enter into agreements relating to the voting of their shares 20 or
the control of any phase of the corporation's business. 21
Although Chapter 302A provides management with sub-
stantially more freedom, it also protects shareholders by in-
creased disclosure requirements. For example, under the new
Act, the corporation, upon written demand, must allow a share-
holder access to records of board and shareholders' meetings,
all articles and bylaws currently in effect, financial statements
distributed to shareholders or governmental agencies as a mat-
ter of record, reports to shareholders within the last three
years, voting trust and shareholder control agreements, and the
share register.22 The shareholder's particular intent or purpose
in obtaining access to this information is irrelevant. 23 In addi-
tion, a shareholder can inspect any other records if he or she
has a "proper purpose."24
The new Act incorporates four other provisions that signifi-
cantly affect both newly-formed and existing businesses incor-
porated in Minnesota. These provisions allow courts to order a
mandatory buy-out,25 bar most claims not fied within one year
of corporate dissolution,26 authorize a special litigation commit-
§§ 302A.203 (board consists of "one or more directors"); 302A.205 (director must
be natural person).
20. Id. § 302A.455.
21. Id. § 302A.457(l). Courts had traditionally regarded such agreements
as impermissible infringements on the power of the board of directors. See Mc-
Quade v. Stoneham & McGraw, 263 N.Y. 323, 330, 189 N.E. 234, 237 (1934). But
see Clark v. Dodge, 269 N.Y. 410, 415-17, 199 N.E. 641, 642-43 (1936) (criticizing
use of McQuade rationale when all shareholders had entered into control
agreement).
22. MmuN. STAT. § 302A.461(4) (Supp. 1981).
23. Under the old law, a shareholder had to show a "proper purpose" prior
to inspection of any documents. Id. § 301.34(5) (1980).
24. Id. § 302A.461(4) (b) (Supp. 1981). The new Act defines a "proper pur-
pose" as "one reasonably related to the person's interest as a shareholder, ben-
eficial owner, or holder of a voting trfist certificate of the corporation." Id. The
reporter's notes indicate that this section adopts the Delaware definition of
"proper purpose" and corresponding case law while effecting no change in the
definition of "proper purpose" set forth by the Minnesota Supreme Court.
MIN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.461 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982). See Founes v.
Hubbard Broadcasting, 302 Minn. 471, 473, 225 N.W.2d 534, 536 (1975); Nation-
wide Corp. v. Northwestern Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 251 Minn. 255, 263, 87 N.W.2d 671,
679-80 (1958). The reporter's notes do indicate, however, that the "standard set
forth in State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, 291 Minn. 322, 327, 191 N.W.2d 406,
410 (1971) of 'investment return' ought to be interpreted broadly." MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 302A.461 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
25. MIN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981); see infra notes 29-90 and accom-
panying text.
26. Mnr. STAT. § 302A.781 (Supp. 1981); see infra notes 91-124 and accom-
panying text.
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tee, 27 and allow corporate merger without a business purpose.28
The remainder of this Note discusses each of these provisions
in greater detail.
I. COURT-ORDERED BUY-OUT
Chapter 302A significantly expands the equitable relief
available to minority shareholders in closely-held corporations
by authorizing a court-ordered sale of a party's interest.29 The
statute allows a court, at its discretion, to order a buy-out of
shares in a closely-held corporation.3 0 A buy-out order may is-
sue upon the motion of the corporation, a shareholder, or a
27. MmN. STAT. § 302A.243 (Supp. 1981); see infra notes 125-83 and accom-
panying text
28. MNN. STAT. § 302A.601-.661 (Supp. 1981); see infra notes 184-228 and ac-
companying text.
29. MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981). The mandatory buy-out provi-
sion reads as follows:
In a case under subdivision 1, clause (b) [grounds for involuntary
dissolution], involving a corporation having 25 or fewer shareholders,
upon motion of a corporation, or of a shareholder or beneficial owner of
shares of the corporation, a court of competent jurisdiction may order
the sale by a plaintiff or a defendant of all shares of the corporation
held by the plaintiff or defendant to either the corporation or the mov-
ing shareholders, whichever is specified in the motion, if the court de-
termines in its discretion that an order would be fair and equitable to
all parties under all of the circumstances of the case.
The purchase price of any shares so sold shall be the fair value of
the shares as of the date of the commencement of the action or as of
another date found equitable by the court.
The purchase price shall be paid in one or more installments as
agreed on by the parties, or, if no agreement can be reached, as or-
dered by the court. Upon entry of an order for the sale of shares under
this subdivision and provided that the corporation or the moving share-
holders post a bond in adequate amount with sufficient sureties or
otherwise satisfy the court that the full purchase price of the shares,
plus such additional costs, expenses, and fees as may be awarded will
be paid when due and payable, the selling shareholders shall no longer
have any rights or status as shareholders, officers, or directors, except
the right to receive the fair value of their shares plus such other
amounts as might be awarded.
Jd If the parties are unable to agree on fair value within 40 days of the entry of
the court order, section 302A.751(2) provides that "the court shall determine
the fair value of the shares under the provisions of section 302A.473, subdivi-
sion 6," referring to the section providing for a dissenting shareholder's de-
mand for payment according to his or her estimate of the shares' value. The
accompanying reporter's note implies that the appraisal procedure in section
302A.473(7) will be used to determine value of the shares. mInNw. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.751(2) reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
30. MuN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981). Since the court may order
either plaintiff or defendant to sell all their shares to the corporation or th
moving shareholders, it is possible for the court to order the buy-out of a major-
ity shareholder by a minority shareholder. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751(2) re-
porter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
1982] 1037
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
beneficial owner, but only if the statutory grounds for involun-
tary dissolution are established.3'
Oppressed minority shareholders in closely-held corpora-
tions may be forced to seek judicial relief because of the illi-
quidity of their investment in the corporation.32 The stock in a
close corporation is usually held by a few shareholders who
often are family members.3 3 Because transactions involving
sales of stock in closely-held corporations are rare, these shares
are relatively unmarketable; therefore, minority shareholders
are typically locked into their investments.34
The marketability problem is especially harmful to minor-
ity shareholders in close corporations if the majority has law-
fully excluded them from participation in the company.35 If the
minority shareholder is a member of a typical close corporation
in which the shareholders are also the directors and the of-
ficers, the minority shareholder may be unable to prevent the
majority from acting against the minority's interest. Outvoted,
the minority is often forced to leave their investment under the
majority's control.36
31. MmN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981). See infra text accompanying
notes 63-72. A shareholder must bring suit for an involuntary dissolution under
section 302A.751(1) before the court may order a buy-out. The court then deter-
mines whether a buy-out order would be fair and equitable to all parties under
all of the circumstances of the case. nmw. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981).
The decision to issue the buy-out order, however, falls under the court's discre-
tion. Id.
32. See generally Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A
Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63
VA. L. REV. 1, 3-6 (1977).
33. See, e.g., Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill..2d 16, 27, 203 N.E.2d 577, 583 (1965). Pro-
fessor Israels describes a close corporation as "a corporation where manage-
ment and ownership are substantially identical to the extent that the
independent judgment of directors is, in fact, a fiction." Israels, The Sacred
Cow of Corporate Existence-The Problems of Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U.
Cm. L. REv. 778, 778 (1952).
34. See Field, Resolving Shareholder Disputes and Breaking Deadlocks in
the Close Corporation, 58 MiNN. L. REV. 985, 986 (1974); Hetherington & Dooley,
supra note 32, at 43.
35. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 43.
36. Id. See also Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 fll.2d 208, 170
N.E.2d 131 (1960). Often, as in the case of partnerships, the relations between
owners of a close corporation are compared to those of marriage partners. See,
e.g., Howe, Corporate Divorce: Deadlocks in the Close Corporation, 22 Bus.
LAw. 469, 469 (1967). Owners of closely-held corporations sometimes view
themselves as partners, and are looking for a sort of hybrid entity, which com-
bines the advantages of partnership, particularly that of easy dissolution,
within the framework of a corporation. Partnership investments are more liq-
uid than those in close corporations, however, because each partner has the
right to dissolve the firm, while a majority of voting shares is necessary for the
voluntary dissolution of a corporation. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note
1038 [Vol. 66:1033
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Minority shareholders in close corporations thus face many
hazards. The majority may drain off earnings through payment
of excessive salaries, bonuses, expense accounts, or other
fringe benefits.37 Loans may be made to officers without ade-
quate security. The -corporation may choose not to declare divi-
dends, leaving minority shareholders without any return on
their investment.3 8 The majority may sell the assets of the cor-
poration without the assent of the minority, or may sell stock to
undesirable shareholders or competitors.3 9
Prior to the enactment of the mandatory buy-out provision,
dissolution was the only statutory relief available in Minnesota
to dissatisfied minority stockholders.40 Involunthry dissolution
is a drastic remedy, however, and traditionally courts have
been hesitant to dissolve a corporation,4 1 especially when its
business was prospering.42 Moreover, the assets employed in a
business may have little value once it ceases to operate as a go-
ing concern. 43 Thus, involuntary dissolution may injure all the
shareholders as well as deprive the community and the econ-
omy of a viable business venture.44
Although other jurisdictions provide alternatives to invol-
untary dissolution, these alternative remedies have proved in-
32, at 3. Moreover, it is more difficult to exclude minority partners from partici-
pation in the management of a partnership than a close corporation, because if
partners disagree, a majority of partners cannot legally prevent a minority part-
ner from participating in the business, or from withdrawing a pro-rata share of
the partnership's earnings. Cf. Elson, Shareholders Agreements, A Shield for
Minority Shareholders of Close Corporations, 22 Btis. LAw. 449, 452 (1967) (ma-
jority rule applies as to most corporate decisions); Note, Some Specific Needs of
the Close Corporation Not Met Under the Minnesota Business Corporation Act:
Some Suggestions for Statutory Relief, 54 MINN. L. REv. 1008, 1009 (1970)
(same).
37. See, e.g., Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1
(1965).
38. The majority may be in a better financial position to weather long peri-
ods without dividends, or may not need dividends because the majority share-
holders receive salaries as officers of the corporation. Cf. In re Radom &
Neidorff, 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954) (president of a closely-held corpora-
tion ran the business, but the opposing fiction refused to sign his salary
checks, leaving him without any compensation for his services).
39. See Elson, supra note 36, at 450.
40. See MmNI. STAT. § 301.49-.50 (1980).
41. See, e.g., Lakeland Dev. Corp. v. Anderson, 227 Minn. 432, 442, 152
N.W.2d 758, 765 (1967) ("the court should grant the drastic remedy of dissolu-
tion with great caution and not in doubtful cases").
42. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS
496 (5th ed. 1980); Howe, supra note 36, at 476.
43. See infra note 88. See also V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIRELSTEIN, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 34, 125 (2d ed. 1979).
44. See Fales, Judicial Attitudes Towards the Rights of Minority Stockhold-
ers, 22 Bus. LAw. 459, 462-63 (1967).
1982] 1039
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
adequate. Some jurisdictions authorize courts to appoint a
custodian empowered to carry on the business of the corpora-
tion for a period of time.45 A custodianship, however, imposes
a high cost on the judicial system.46 Moreover, this alternative
is merely temporary, and represents an extreme invasion of the
rights of shareholders opposing the custodian.47 The custodian
has no proprietary interest in the corporation, and thus has li-
tie to gain from aggressive or innovative policies. Instead, the
custodian's concern is to forestall criticism and to maintain the
status quo. The inherent uncertainty regarding the tenure of
custodians hinders their dealings with customers, suppliers,
and employees.4 s Perhaps in recognition of the difficulties in-
volved, the appointment of a custodian is a remedy employed
only rarely by the courts. 9
Some jurisdictions authorize the court to appoint a provi-
sional director empowered to break deadlocks.50 This alterna-
tive does little to protect the interests of minority shareholders,
however, since the appointed director acts only when the vot-
ing shares of the corporation are divided equally between two
rival factions.5 ' The appointment of a provisional director inev-
itably relegates some of the formerly equal shareholders to mi-
nority status.5 2 The other faction, having gained a majority of
one, may be able to make changes in the control structure of
the corporation that have a persisting effect even after the pro-
visional director is no longer sitting.5 3
It is also unreasonable to expect agreements entered into
during the formation of the corporation to protect the minority
shareholders adequately. The parties often assume upon incor-
poration that they will be in substantial agreement as to the op-
eration of the firm.5 4 If future disputes are unforeseen,
45. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 226(a) (1974).
46. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 25 ('Temporary custodial
or judicially monitored management is costly to the judicial system and to the
parties, both in continuing legal expenses and in lost opportunities.").
47. I&
48. Id. at 25-26.
49. Id. at 23 n.64.
50. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 308, 1802 (West Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 353 (1974).
51. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 21.
52. Id. at 21-22.
53. See W. CARY & AL EISENBERG, supra note 42, at 500. See also In re Jam-
ison Steel Corp., 158 Cal. App. 2d 27, 322 P.2d 246 (1958), in which cumulative
voting allowed both the minority and majority factions to elect two directors.
The provisional director voted with the majority's two directors to increase the
board to five directors, thereby permanently altering the balance of power.
54. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 2, 36-37.
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shareholders' agreements may be ineffective or may never be
executed.55 The cost alone of retaining counsel to draft com-
plex shareholders' agreements may preclude their use.
The mandatory buy-out provision responds to the short-
comings of involuntary dissolution and its alternatives. 56 Ab-
sent statutory authority, courts may be reluctant to order
intermediate relief short of involuntary dissolution.5 7 Because
an order of involuntary dissolution was rare,58 an oppressed mi-
nority shareholder in a close corporation could not be certain of
obtaining judicial relief. Under the new Act, minority share-
holders may move for a court ordered purchase of their
shares, 59 or alternatively may move to have the corporation dis-
solved and its assets sold.60 If the court decides a buy-out is
equitable, the parties may either negotiate or litigate the value
of the shares in the corporation. 61
To obtain a court-ordered buy-out, a shareholder must initi-
ate a suit and establish the grounds for involuntary dissolu-
tion.62 The new Act broadens these grounds. Previously,
involuntary dissolution was available only upon a showing that:
corporate assets were insufficient to pay debts;63 the object of
the corporation had failed, been abandoned, or become imprac-
ticable;6 4 the directors were guilty of fraud, mismanagement,
55. See Field, supra note 34, at 985.
56. See Mnna. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
57. Id. But see Thwing v. McDonald, 134 Minn. 148, 153-54, 158 N.W. 820, 822
(1916), in which the court indicated that remedies short of dissolution should
be considered.
58. Cf. Lakeland Dev. Corp. v. Anderson, 227 Minn. 432, 442, 152 N.W.2d 758,
765 (1967) (courts hesitant to grant dissolution).
59. MmN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981).
60. Id. § 302A.751(1) (b).
61. Initially, the parties to the sale have the right to agree upon the fair
value of the shares. If they can agree upon the fair value within 40 days of the
court order, the court will accept the agreed-upon value as "fair." If no agree-
ment is reached, the court will determine the fair value using the same method
it would use in an appraisal or dissenters' rights proceedings. Id. § 302A.751(2);
MmN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982). For a discus-
sion of how courts value businesses in appraisal or dissenters' rights proceed-
ings, see V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIREISTEIN, supra note 43, at 1-78. See alo In re
Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416, 435 (1941) ('The value derivable from [a com-
pany] as an operating entity is dependent in large Part upon the amount of
earnings to be obtained from the property as reorganized and the length of
time for which such earnings will be available."); Francis L DuPont & Co. v.
Universal Studios, 312 A.2d 344 (Del. Ch. 1973) (court used two factors, earnings
and assets, and assigned different weights to them in determining the value of
the enterprise).
62. See MINN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981).
63. Id. § 301.49(1) (1980).
64. Id. § 301.49(2). This ground has been eliminated under Chapter 302A,
1982] 1041
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abuse of authority, or persistent unfairness towards minority
shareholders;65 the shareholders were so deadlocked that the
business could not be conducted to the advantage of the share-
holders;66 or, the prescribed duration of the corporation had ex-
pired without extension.67 Chapter 302A establishes several
additional grounds for involuntary dissolution, including waste
of corporate assets,68 failure to elect directors,69 and corporate
admission of insolvency.70 In addition, the new Act explicitly
allows involuntary dissolution of profitable corporations7 l and
eliminates the deadlock requirement.72
Although most of the grounds for involuntary dissolution
and mandatory buy-outs are relatively straightforward,73 the
exact meaning of persistent unfairness or oppression 74 remains
unsettled. One author used this definition:
"[B]urdensome, harsh and wrongful conduct," "a lack of probity and
fair dealing in the affairs of a company to the prejudice of some of its
members," or "a visual departure from the standards of fair dealing,
and a violation of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts
his money to a company is entitled to rely."75
This definition suggests that persistent unfairness is closely re-
lated to the fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing which
id. § 302A.751(l) (b) (Supp. 1981), most likely because the requirement that a
corporation state a specific business purpose in its articles has been elimi-
nated. Id. §§ 302A.101, .751(1) (b).
65. Id. § 301.49(3) (1980).
66. Id. § 301.49(4).
67. Id. § 301.49(5).
68. Id. § 302A.751(1) (b) (4) (Supp. 1981).
69. Id. § 302A.751(1)(b)(3).
70. Id. § 302A.751(1) (c) (2).
71. Id. § 302A.751(3).
72. Compare id. § 301.49(4) (1980) (old law) with id. § 302A.751(1) (b) (3)
(Supp. 1981) (new law).
73. Although any of the grounds for involuntary dissolution can support a
motion for a mandatory buy-out order, the ground of "persistent unfairness" is
probably both the most difficult to define and the most likely to be advanced by
a disgruntled minority shareholder in a close corporation. While deadlock is a
commonly advanced ground for dissolution, it is by its very terms inapplicable
in regard to protecting a minority interest, unless the articles require a super-
majority, in which case the minority has more leverage than is normal in a
close corporation. The grounds of fraud, waste, and failure to elect directors
are relatively easy to define, and may be elements of a claim of "persistent un-
fairness." The ground of expiration of the period of duration is self-
explanatory.
74. Many statutes use the term "oppression" rather than "persistent un-
fairness" but the meaning of the terms are comparable. See W. CARY & M. EI-
SENBERG, supra note 42, at 508.
75. Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Corporate Dissolu-
tion, 1965 DuxE L.J. 128, 134 (quoting Scottish Co-op. Wholesale Soc'y, Ltd. v.
Meyer, [1958] 3 All E.R. 66, 71, 86 (HL); Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., 1952 Sess.
Cas. 49, 55 (Scot. 7th Div.)).
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majority shareholders owe to the minority.76 This definition
seems to justify a buy-out order if shareholders abuse their cor-
porate positions for private gain or attempt to plunder a close
corporation by siphoning off profits through the payment of ex-
cessive salaries or bonuses.77 Courts may also infer persistent
unfairness if the majority shareholders have refused to allow
the minority to participate in the affairs of the corporation. 78
Courts could look to, for example, majority refusals to consult
with the minority, refusals to put meritorious minority propos-
als into effect, or hostility towards the minority.79 In addition, a
court trying to assess whether the majority's persistent unfair-
ness warrants a buy-out order should examine the reasonable-
ness of the shareholder's expectations. A reasonable minority
shareholder's expectations will vary depending on the circum-
stances and the nature of the corporation. At the minimum,
shareholders expect to be dealt with honestly and to share in
the profits, but in some circumstances minority shareholders
may expect to have a significant voice in the management of
the corporation.80  The term "persistent unfairness" affords
courts the latitude necessary to determine whether grounds for
dissolution or a buy-out exist in a variety of circumstances.8 '
Although a buy-out order is contingent upon a showing of
the grounds for involuntary dissolution, courts should order
buy-outs upon a lesser showing than they require in an invol-
untary dissolution proceeding. Because a buy-out is a less
drastic remedy than an involuntary dissolution, courts should
be willing to order a buy-out in situations in which an involun-
tary dissolution would be inappropriate. 82 A court-ordered buy-
76. Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, 264 Or. 614, 629, 507 P.2d 387, 394
(1973).
77. See id.
78. Cf. In re Hedberg-Freidheim & Co., 233 Minn. 534, 536-39, 47 N.W.2d 424,
426-27 (1951) (parties owned the same number of shares, but one used his posi-
tion to take control of the business and exclude the other). Although the court
found the plaintiff's allegations stated the grounds for persistent unfairness,
the court ordered dissolution on the grounds of deadlock. Id. at 539-40, 47
N.W.2d at 428.
79. A single act of misdeed may be insufficient, however, since the term
'"persistent unfairness" seems to contemplate a continuing course of conduct.
Persistent unfairness, however, is not synonymous with illegal or fraudulent
conduct, and the absence of mismanagement, or misapplication of assets, does
not prevent a finding of persistent unfairness or oppression. Baker v. Commer-
cial Body Builders, 264 Or. 614, 628-30, 507 P.2d 387, 393-94 (1973).
80. See Comment, supra note 75, at 141.
81. See id.
82. Cf. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.751 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982)
('This section provides explicit statutory authority [to order buy-outs]; that au-
thority is meant to be used."). The reporter also writes that "equitable relief
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out is an especially attractive alternative to dissolution when a
corporation is operating profitably. For example, in Thwing v.
McDonald83 the Minnesota Supreme Court was reluctant to or-
der the involuntary dissolution of a solvent corporation, but
showed a willingness to investigate remedies short of dissolu-
tion.84 The specific authority to grant intermediate relief given
the court by the new Act should encourage courts to grant re-
lief in situations in which they were hesitant to do so in the
past.
The addition of the buy-out provision to the arsenal of rem-
edies available to the court provides minority shareholders in
close corporations with much needed protection. Aside from
the benefit of increasing the liquidity of minority investments,
the buy-out provision diminishes the likelihood of majority ex-
ploitation, by providing the minority with a low cost, conve-
nient remedy.85 Since all parties know in advance that the
minority may have a legal right to withdraw its pro-rata portion
of the current value of the firm, a fair but nonjudicial settle-
ment is more likely than under prior law. The possibility of a
court ordered buy-out thus reduces the majority's ability to ex-
tort concessions from the minority with the threat of involun-
tary dissolution. By discouraging exploitative behavior, the
new Act should save judicial resources and litigation costs, and
reduce the need for complex and costly private agreements in-
volving control or stock purchase options. Since the majority
must pay a fair price for the minority's stock, it cannot appro-
priate the minority's interest at bargain rates. The majority,
therefore, can increase its own wealth only by increasing the
productivity of the firm. As exploitative behavior becomes less
profitable for the majority, the incentive to manage fairly and
efficiently increases. 86
The buy-out provision neither overprotects minority share-
holders, nor allows them to extort disproportionate gains from
the majority. Because a buy-out order will issue only at the
court's discretion,87 the petitioner will most likely carry a sub-
[may be ordered] whenever the grounds for involuntary dissolution have been
established." Id. Nevertheless, provided that the court determines that the
buy-out order will be fair and equitable, see MmN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp.
1981), a prima facie case for involuntary dissolution should suffice to justify a
buy-out order.
83. 134 Minn. 148, 158 N.W.820 (1916).
84. Id. at 153-54, 158 N.W. at 822.
85. See Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 47.
86. See id. at 46-48.
87. See MmN. STAT. § 302A.751(2) (Supp. 1981).
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stantial burden of showing the transaction to be fair to all par-
ties. If tie court finds that a buy-out order would be fair and
the minority's interest in the corporation is small, it can be eas-
fly purchased by the majority. If the minority's interest is
large, it is unlikely to request dissolution. Minority sharehold-
ers have an incentive to avoid dissolution and negotiate a sell-
ing price with the majority, because the minority's share of the
corporation's going concern value is lost unless the business is
sold intact to a third party or the majority purchases its
interest.88
It is also unlikely that the buy-out provision will have the
effect of depriving the community of viable businesses.8 9 Mi-
nority shareholders have little incentive to invoke their buy-out
right if the business is profitably, efficiently, and fairly man-
aged. Since the majority can always liquidate voluntarily, it
presumably views liquidation as contrary to its own interests.
A shareholder who wishes to sell stock in a profitable business
should find a willing buyer in the majority who will prefer rais-
ing the necessary capital for purchasing the minority's interest
to liquidating the business. If the majority cannot purchase the
minority interest out of its own funds, it can borrow or solicit
new investors. Because the buy-out provision enhances the li-
quidity of investments in close corporations, outside investors
will be easier to attract. Moreover, as more investment capital
becomes available, the need to exercise the mandatory buy-out
will decrease; the minority will be able to sell its interest more
readily on the open market, obviating the need to resort to the
courts. Finally, since the minority can purchase the majority's
interest, it is even less likely that a mandatory buy-out will re-
sult in liquidation of the corporation. A business will be liqui-
dated only if neither the majority nor anyone else finds the
business sufficiently profitable to continue. There is little social
cost in the demise of unprofitable businesses.9 0
The mandatory buy-out provision is an innovative solution
to the problem of minority illiquidity and exploitation in
closely-held corporations. It protects minority interests with-
out unduly prejudicing the rights of the majority or subverting
the nature of close corporations. In addition, the new provision
88. "Frequently, the assets employed in a business have little extrinsic
value once the business is terminated and no longer operates as a going con-
cern. Thus, dissolution tends in many instances to injure all stockholders, as
well as to deprive the community and the economy of a going business ven-
ture." Fales, supra note 44, at 462-63.
89. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 32, at 49-50.
90. Id. at 50.
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should benefit the economy and the community by encouraging
investment opportunities and reducing court and transaction
costs.
III. ONE YEAR CLAIM BAR
Chapter 302A bars, with one exception, claims by or against
a dissolved corporation that were not pending on the date of
dissolution.91 Nevertheless, claims may be filed for one year af-
ter the filing of the articles of dissolution or the entry of a de-
cree of dissolution if the creditor or claimant "shows good
cause for not having previously filed the claim."92 In addition,
the Act does not bar claims resulting from obligations or liabili-
ties incurred during dissolution.93 This new treatment sharply
contrasts with former Minnesota law, which held the dissolved
corporation open to suit for three years beyond the date of
dissolution.94
The former Minnesota statutes were enacted to mitigate a
harsh common law doctrine. At early common law, the dissolu-
tion of a corporation abated all future claims against the corpo-
91. MINN. STAT. § 302A.781(1) (Supp. 1981). The entire section reads as
follows:
Subdivision 1. Claims barred. A creditor or claimant who does
not file a claim or pursue a remedy in a legal, administrative, or arbitra-
tion proceeding under sections 302A.729, 302A.741, 302A.751 or 302A.759,
or in some other legal, administrative, or arbitration proceeding pend-
ing on the date of dissolution, and all those claiming through or under
the creditor or claimant, are forever barred from suing on that claim or
otherwise realizing upon or enforcing it, except as provided in this sec-
tion.
Subd. 2. Claims reopened. At any time within one year after arti-
cles of dissolution have been fied with the secretary of state, or a de-
cree of dissolution has been entered, a creditor or claimant who shows
good cause for not having previously fied the claim may apply to a
court in this state to allow a claim:
(a) Against the corporation to the extent of undistributed assets;
or
(b) If the undistributed assets are not sufficient to satisfy the
claim, against a shareholder, whose liability shall be limited to a por-
tion of the claim that is equal to the portion of the distributions to
shareholders in liquidation or dissolution received by the shareholder.
Subd. 3. Claims permitted. All debts, obligations, and liabilities
incurred during dissolution proceedings shall be paid by the corpora-
tion before the distribution of assets to a shareholder. A person to
whom this kind of debt, obligation, or liability is owed but not paid may
pursue any remedy against the officers, directors, and shareholders of
the corporation before the expiration of the applicable statute of limita-
tions. This subdivision does not apply to dissolution under the super-
vision or order of a court.
Id. § 302A781.
92. Id. § 302A.781(2).
93. Id. § 302A.781(3).
94. The former Minnesota law was the result of the interaction of two sec-
tions. See MINN. STAT. §§ 300.59, 301.54(4) (1980).
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harsh common law doctrine. At early common law, the dissolu-
tion of a corporation abated all future claims against the corpo-
ration.9 5 Those creditors or claimants who had not filed their
claims prior to dissolution were forever barred. The common
law rule was in accord with the major goal of dissolution-to
provide a quick, certain, and final accounting of the business.9 6
Courts, rebelling against a lack of protection for legitimate
claimants, eventually allowed personal actions against the
shareholders and directors of a dissolved corporation on the ba-
sis of the "trust fund" theory.9 7 The courts reasoned that when
a corporation was dissolved, the assets became a "'trust fund
against which the corporate creditors have a... claim' prior to
that of the shareholders or any transferee who is not a bona
fide purchaser."B A party claiming an obligation of the corpo-
ration could thus sue shareholders for the amount they re-
ceived when the corporation was dissolved.99 In addition,
distributing directors were potentially liable in their capacities
as trustees for the creditors and shareholders for a breach of
fiduciary duty involving the dissolution. This liability was per-
sonal, and attached even though the director had recieved no
share of the assets of the dissolved corporation.10o Thus, al-
though the corporation was not itself open to suit, claimants
could obtain some limited relief.
Legislatures, through laws such as the former Minnesota
law' 0 ' and the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),102 ex-
95. Friedlander & Lannie, Post-Dissolution Liabilities of Shareholders and
Directors for Claims Against Dissolved Corporations, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1363,
1400 (1978); Wallach, Products Liability: A Remedy in Search of a Defendant-
The Effect of a Sale of Assets and Subsequent Dissolution on Product Dissatis-
faction Claims, 41 Mo. L. REV. 321, 323 (1976).
96. See MINN. STAT. Arm. § 302A.781 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982);
16A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 8157-58
(rev. perm. ed. 1979). See also Bishop v. Schield Bantam Co., 293 F. Supp. 94, 96
(N.D. Iowa 1968) (policy of a definite termination point "inherent" in
dissolution).
97. See Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 95, at 1367; Norton, Relationship
of Shareholders to Corporate Creditors Upon Dissolution: Nature and Implica-
tions of the "Trust Fund" Doctrine of Corporate Assets, 30 Bus. LAw. 1061, 1061
(1975); Note, Shareholder Liability Upon Liquidation of a Corporation, 46
UMKC L. REv. 454, 461 (1978).
98. Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 95, at 1367 (quoting 16A W. FLETCHER,
supra note 96, § 8161 at 371; Norton, supra note 97, at 1061-72).
99. Note, supra note 97, at 466.
100. See Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 95, at 1368.
101. MmNN. STAT. §§ 300.59, 301.54 (1980). The effects of this type of statutory
section on the liability of shareholders and directors under the "trust fund"
theory is not entirely clear, although one view holds that the time limit in the
statute also bars "trust fund" actions. Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 95, at
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panded claimant rights by allowing suit against the corporation
if the action were commenced within a specified time period af-
ter dissolution. The former Minnesota law provided that to
conclude its affairs the corporation would continue to exist for
three years following dissolution. 0 3 The result of this law was a
three year grace period in which to press claims against the
dissolved corporation. The MBCA provides that claimant rights
against the corporation would continue for two years.104 In ad-
dition, several states have enacted statutes patterned after the
MBCA which provide up to five years to press claims. 05
New Jersey statutes, which are the model for Minnesota's
new claim-bar provision,10 6 codify claimant rights against both
the shareholders and the corporation. 0 7 New Jersey law pro-
vides that a claimant, who shows good cause for not having
filed before dissolution, may press a claim against a dissolved
corporation or a shareholder who received a portion of the as-
sets of the liquidated corporation.X08 As one commentator
noted,109 this provision seems to hold open perpetually share-
holder liability for contingent claims, such as claims for prod-
uct defects or breached warranties." 0 Because such claims
may not mature until years after the original purchase of the
product,"' any claimant suing shortly after maturation, but
many years after the dissolution, could easily show good cause
for the lateness of the claim. The commentator therefore sug-
gested that the statute be amended by affixing an absolute time
limit beyond which claims would be barred.n2
Chapter 302A embodies a response to that suggestion by
including an absolute bar to all claims fied more than one year
after dissolution. The expressed purpose of the new one year
1381. The bar on "trust fund" actions seems to be in accord with the policy of
finality underlying these statutes. Id. at 1401.
102. MODEL BusmnEss CORP. AcT § 105 (1979).
103. MINN. STAT. § 300.59 (1980).
104. MODEL BusiNEss CORP. ACT § 105 (1979).
105. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 10-2A-203 (1980); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-1014
(1979). See also Wallach, supra note 95, at 325.
106. MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.781 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
107. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-13 (West Supp. 1981-82).
108. Id.
109. Kessler, The New Jersey Business Corporation Act: Some Effects of the
1974 Amendments on Close Corporations, 28 RUT. L. REV. 96, 111 (1974).
110. Contingent liabilities may be defined as those which had not yet arisen
at dissolution. The underlying obligation is not due and payable at the time of
dissolution. The former Minnesota law provided that contingent claims were
not subject to the three year time limit. Mrm. STAT. § 301.54(4) (1980).
111. Kessler, supra note 109, at 111; Wallach, supra note 95, at 325-26.
112. Kessler, supra note 109, at 111.
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time limit is to "provide some incentive for creditors and claim-
ants to file their claims at the time that other claims are being
processed."" 3 The corporation thus receives notice prior to dis-
solution of virtually all claims against it, and may promptly pay
legitimate claims and resist others.
The new Act allows plaintiffs to pursue claims fied within
one year of the dissolution only for "good cause."11 4 According
to the reporter's notes, good cause includes circumstances in
which the claimant never received notice of dissolution or the
claim did not arise until the dissolution was complete;" 5 in
these circumstances, the trial court retains discretion to hear
the claim." 6 The absolute one year time limit thus promotes
certainty and timely filing of claims."17 In addition, if an action
against the corporation would be allowed but would not yield
enough to satisfy the claim," 8 the claimant may also sue the
shareholders.11 9 The dissolution process is thereby in accord
with the main goal of dissolution "to end the corporate exist-
ence as quickly and neatly as possible."' 20
The statute's treatment of matured obligations arising prior
to dissolution strikes a fair balance between the corporation's
interest in the expeditious termination of its affairs and liti-
gants' interests in pursuing claims against the corporation.
Claimants whose claims mature prior to dissolution should re-
ceive sufficient notice to enable them to file before dissolution;
claimants who do not receive notice may file claims for one
113. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.781 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
114. MINN. STAT. § 302A.781(2) (Supp. 1981).
115. Mm. STAT. ANN. § 302A.781 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. ImN. STAT. § 302A.781(2) (b) (Supp. 1981). The statute specifies the or-
der in which defendants can be sued. A shareholder is not open to suit unless
the remaining assets of the corporation are inadequate to satisfy the claim. Id.
119. The maximum liability of shareholders in any suit is "limited to a por-
tion of the claim that is equal to the portion of the distributions to shareholders
in liquidation or dissolution received by the shareholder." MINN. STAT.
§ 302A.781(2) (b) (Supp. 1981). The Task Force clarified this language with an
example showing that a shareholder receiving 15% of the distribution is liable
for the lesser of either the amount received in distribution or 15% of the judg-
ment recovered by the claimant. MitNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.781 reporter's notes
(West Supp. 1981).
The statute places no liability on directors. The policies underlying stat-
utes which bar claims indicate that director liability under the "trust fund" the-
ory has no continuing vitality. See generally Friedlander & Lannie, supra note
95.
120. M'NN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.781 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982); cf.
Friedlander & Lannie, supra note 95, at 1401 (survival statute intended to pro-
tect certainty and definiteness, as well as to protect certain claims).
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year after dissolution, because the failure to receive notice
should constitute good cause for filing late. 12 1
The failure of the new Act to preserve litigants' contingent
claims beyond the one year time limit presents a larger prob-
lem. Because the claim would not arise until after the expira-
tion of the absolute time limit, the claimant has no r~course
against the dissolved corporation or its shareholders.122 In
some instances, the effect of this rule may be unjust-valid
claimants will be denied a remedy. Nevertheless, there is some
justification for barring contingent claims after some essen-
tially arbitrary time limit has elapsed. The purpose underlying
corporate dissolution is analogous to the settlement of the es-
tate of a decedent.123 The overall goal in both types of proceed-
ings is finality. The heirs of a deceased person are usually not
responsible for the liabilities of the deceased once the estate is
settled.124 The uncertainty involved in allowing such claims is
simply not acceptable. By analogy, the possibility that a claim
against a dissolved corporation could arise decades later in-
volves too much uncertainty for the shareholders. The uncer-
tainty simply outweighs the gain provided by such a remedy.
The analogy between the dissolution of a corporation and
the closing of a decedent's estate is, however, not perfect. Al-
though heirs taking from an estate probably committed no con-
scious acts to become heirs, shareholders usually make a
conscious decision to become. involved with the corporation.
The shareholders may well have received increased dividends
due to the business activity giving rise to the contingent claim.
In addition, shareholders normally enjoy a continuous eco-
nomic interest in the corporation and benefit from their limited
liability as shareholders. Although a policy allowing contingent
claims at any time after the dissolution involves too much un-
certainty, the one year time bar is too restrictive; a longer pe-
riod is necessary to protect contingent claimants. The
legislature should therefore consider amending the statute to
121. Claims that mature just before the end of the statutory time period
may be barred if not filed immediately. While the result may seem unjust, it is
an unavoidable consequence of any absolute time bar.
122. Chapter 302A also protects the purchasers of the assets of a dissolved
corporation from liability. Mmii. STAT. § 302A.661(4) (Supp. 1981). Under sec-
tion 302A.661(4), the purchaser would be liable for such claims only if the
purchase agreement provided for that liability. See generally Wallach, supra
note 95, at 335-45.
123. See Oklahoma Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 273 U.S. 257, 259 (1927); Wallach,
supra note 95, at 324.
124. See 273 U.S. at 259.
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reach a more equitable balance between the shareholders' in-
terests in the finality of dissolution and contingent claimants'
interests in recovery.
IV. SPECIAL LITIGATION COMMITTEE
Chapter 302A specifically authorizes the creation of a spe-
cial litigation committee,125 composed of "disinterested" per-
sons, who may or may not be directors of the corporation. 2 6
The committee is empowered to dismiss suits-including
shareholder's derivative suits-brought on behalf of a corpora-
tion,127 if the committee finds that pursuing the suit is not "in
the best interest of the corporation."' 28 When a litigation com-
mittee dismisses a suit, it is expected to set forth specific, busi-
ness-related reasons supporting the conclusion that the suit is
not in the best interests of the corporation.129 If the committee
makes its decision in good faith, the decision is final and binds
the corporation and shareholders unless a court finds that the
125. MIN. STAT. § 302A.243 (Supp. 1981). The provision authorizing the cre-
ation of a special litigation committee reads as follows:
Unless prohibited by the articles or bylaws, the board may estab-
lish a committee composed of two or more disinterested directors or
other disinterested persons to determine whether it is in the best inter-
ests of the corporation to pursue a particular legal right or remedy of
the corporation and whether to cause the dismissal or discontinuance
of a particular proceeding that seeks to assert a right or remedy on be-
half of the corporation. For purposes of this section, a director or other
person is "disinterested" if the director is not the owner of more than
one percent of the outstanding shares of, or a present or former officer,
employee, or agent of, the corporation or of a related corporation and
has not been made or threatened to be made a party to the proceeding
in question. The committee, once established, is not subject to the di-
rection or control of, or termination by, the board. A vacancy on the
committee may be filled by a majority vote of the remaining members.
The good faith determinations of the committee are binding upon the
corporation and its directors, officers, and shareholders. The commit-
tee terminates when it issues a written report of its determinations.
Id.
The new Act significantly expands the ability of corporations to create com-
mittees governing all aspects of corporate activity. Although former law per-
mitted the appointment of an executive committee, it required unanimous
board approval before the committee could act. MINN. STAT. § 301.28(4) (7)
(1980). The new Act requires only a majority vote. Any number of committees
may be created for any purpose. Committee members need not be directors of
the corporation. With the exception of the litigation committee, however, all
committees are subject to the control of the board of directors. See id.
§§ 302A.241, 302A.243 (Supp. 1981).
126. See supra note 125.
127. Shareholder's derivative suits are the primary example of suits
brought on behalf of the corporation.
128. MIN. STAT. § 302A.243 (Supp. 1981).
129. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.243 reporter's note (West Supp. 1982).
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committee was not independent and objective. 3 0 Upon such a
finding, a court presumably will order the reinstatement of the
suit.131
The shareholder's derivative suit developed as an equitable
remedy to check abuses of power by corporate management.132
Corporate directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation's
shareholders, which requires them to discharge their manage-
ment duties in good faith.133 The directors appoint officers, who
have some discretion but are expected to effectuate the policies
of the board.134 Shareholders usually bring derivative suits
against corporate officers or directors for alleged misconduct in
the performance of their corporate duties.135 The shareholder,
however, is only a nominal plaintiff; the cause of action and any
recovery belong to the corporation. 36
Although a shareholder may bring a derivative suit to rem-
edy directors' or officers' misconduct, derivative suits are often
abused. Although the rationale behind derivative suits is to
check abuses of corporate management, derivative suits are
130. Id. See also Note, The Business Judgment Rule and the Litigation Com-
mittee: .The End of a Clear Trend in Corporate Law, 14 IND. L. REV. 617, 635-36
(1981).
131. See Mnm. STAT. § 302A.243 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
132. See Prunty, The Shareholder's Derivative Suit: Notes on its Deriva-
tions, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 980 (1957).
133. See Note, supra note 130, at 618. See also Mum. STAT. § 302A.251(1)
(Supp. 1981), which defines the good faith'standard of conduct for directors as
follows:
A director shall discharge the duties of the position of director in good
faith, in a manner the director reasonably believes to be in the best in-
terests of the corporation, and with the care an ordinarily prudent per-
son in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances. A
person who so performs those duties is not liable by reason of being or
having been a director of the corporation.
134. See, e.g., Mmw. STAT. § 302A.311 (Supp. 1981); Elson, supra note 36, at
452.
135. See Nornstein, The Counsel Fee in Shareholder's Derivative Suits, 39
COLum. L. REV. 784, 797 (1939) (finding that in nearly all successful derivative
suits defendants included one or more directors or officers of corporation).
136. Warner v. E.C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565, 569, 33 N.W.2d 721, 724 (1948).
Shareholder's derivative suits may be initiated for various purposes. A share-
holder may seek to -enjoin the corporation from engaging in certain conduct,
see, e.g., Horwitz v. Balaban, 112 F. Supp. 99 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); or to challenge a
certain transaction, see, e.g., Maldonado v. Flynn, 413"A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch.), rev'd
on other grounds, 417 A.2d 378 (Del. Ch. 1980); or to pursue an unasserted cor-
porate claim against third parties, see, e.g., Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
331 (1855). Although any monetary recovery belongs to the corporation, a large
recovery could significantly increase the value of a shareholder's interests in
the corporation. In addition, shareholders are usually indemnified for the costs
of bringing suit. Shareholders may thus bring suits merely to harass a corpora-
tion, or to recover attorney's fees.
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sometimes used as a vehicle for corporate extortion. 3 7 These
so-called strike suits often are brought by plaintiffs who are
pursuing something other than the corporation's best inter-
ests. 3 8 A single dissident shareholder, owning only one share
of stock, may file a derivative suit for its nuisance value alone.
Because plaintiffs in derivative suits usually recover costs and
attorney's fees, unscrupulous attorneys may initiate suits for
the sole purpose of realizing large fees.139 A shareholder of a
rival corporation may acquire a single share of stock and initi-
ate a suit to harass or embarrass a competitor.140
Even if a suit is brought by a well-meaning shareholder,
there is no reason to believe that a minority shareholder is
more likely to act in the best interest of the corporation than
are the directors who are elected by a majority of stockhold-
ers.1 41 Shareholders often lack corporate information, and may
not have a realistic conception of the corporation's best inter-
ests.142 A shareholder may, through the medium of a derivative
137. See generally Note, Extortionate Corporate Litigation: The Strike Suit,
34 CoLUm. L. REV. 1308 (1934).
138. See Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 548 (1949). See
generally Block & Barton, The Business Judgment Rule as Applied to Stock-
holder Proxy Derivative Suits under the Securities and Exchange Act, 8 SEC.
REG. L. J. 99, 100 (1980).
139. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 42, at 979:
As a practical matter, the engine that normally drives a derivative ac-
tion involving a public held corporation is not the plaintiff, but the
plaintiff's attorney. The plaintiff typically makes little or no investment
in the action and stands to gain very little benefit. His attorney, on the
other hand, makes a very substantial investment (in the form of his
time and disbursements) and stands to reap a very substantial benefit
(in the form of a fee). This raises the unwholesome possibility that de-
fendants may be able to make an improper settlement by giving their
acquiescence to an inflated fee in exchange for acquiescence by plain-
tiff's counsel to an inadequate corporate recovery.
Id. (footnote omitted). See also Fistel v. Christman, 133 F. Supp. 300 (S.D.N.Y.
1955) (plaintiffs attorney agreed to dismiss Securities Exchange Act § 16(b) ac-
tion on condition that defendant pay him $2,500 for legal services); Jamison v.
Butcher & Sherrerd, 68 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1975) (proposed settlement of class
action involved no benefit to the class but called for payment by defendants of
$50,000 attorneys' fee).
140. Private settlements, even though prohibited by statute, see, e.g., Mm.
R. Civ. PRO. 23.06 (requiring prior court approval of settlements), may still
make it possible for a plaintiff to profit from a nuisance suit if a secret settle-
ment goes undiscovered. Moreover, the rules requiring court approval of settle-
ments do not apply to derivative suits threatened but not filed. See Dent, The
Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death of the Deriv-
ative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REV. 96, 137-40 (1980).
141. Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 1980).
142. See F. WOOD, SuRVEY AND REPORT REGARDING SHAREHOLDER'S DERIVA-
TIVE Surrs 45-47 (1944). The problem is exacerbated, since shareholders decid-
ing whether to pursue corporate claims are not burdened by fiduciary duties
like those of a director.
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suit, attempt to force a corporation to effectuate personally held
beliefs, or broad public policy goals, which are not necessarily
in the corporation's or the other shareholders' best interests.143
The traditional justification for allowing director or litiga-
tion committee dismissal of derivative suits has been the busi-
ness judgment rule.144 Under the business judgment rule,
courts will not intervene in corporate decision making, if the di-
rectors exercise good faith judgments in an honest, unbiased,
and reasonable manner.145 The business judgment rule is
based on the courts' belief that shareholders' interests in a
business corporation are limited to preserving the value of
their investment. 46 Because directors are uniquely situated to
make business decisions, the rule presumes that business judg-
ments are best left to their expertise, or to committees ap-
pointed by them, rather than to shareholders. Absent fraud or
illegality, shareholders should have no more right to challenge
the directors' decision to dismiss a derivative suit than to chal-
143. Cf. State ex rel. Pillsbury v. Honeywell, Inc., 291 Minn. 322, 191 N.W.2d
406 (1971) (in suit for inspection of corporate books, shareholder's sole motiva-
tion for buying stock in a company was to attempt to change the course of the
company's business, because the company's course of business was incompati-
ble with his political views).
144. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1243 (D. Minn. 1978),
a.fOd, 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
145. See, e.g., Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979). Directors are insulated from personal liability for
acts within the scope of their management duties so long as they act in good
faith. See, e.g., MIN. STAT. § 302A.251(1) (Supp. 1981). In Minnesota, directors
act in good faith when they perform their duties in a manner which they rea-
sonably believe "to be in the best interests of the corporation, and with the
care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under
similar circumstances." Id. Thus, a court will not hold a director liable for hon-
est errors or mistakes of judgment, and directors are not held to be guarantors
of their companies' success. Otherwise, few, if any, individuals would be will-
ing to become directors. See Chaplin, Outside Directors and Their Responsibili-
ties: A Program for the Exercise of Due Care, 1 J. Cosp. L 57, 59 (1975); see also
Note, supra note 130, at 621.
146. See Rosengarten v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 466 F. Supp. 817, 824
(S.D.N.Y. 1979):
A derivative action is designed to redress wrongs to the corporation
and not wrongs to the public. If the directors legitimately determine
that such an action will not benefit the corporation, then, regardless of
the illegality of the underlying transaction, the business judgment rule
permits termination of the suit.
Id. Courts thus acknowledge that the fundamental purpose of a business cor-
poration is to make money for its shareholders; neither the corporation nor its
shareholders are guardians of the public. See id. Moreover, if a shareholder
disagrees with a decision of the directors or a committee appointed by the
board, the shareholder can vote against the directors at the next election, or
sell his or her interest in the corporation.
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lenge any other business decision of the board of directors.147
The business judgment rule therefore recognizes that courts
should not substitute their judgment for that of the directors.148
There are several reasons why courts traditionally defer to
directors' business decisions. State law places the responsibil-
ity of management on the board of directors;149 it would there-
fore be unfair to allow a court, which is totally unaccountable
to the shareholders, to second-guess decisions of the direc-
tors.150 Moreover, because derivative claims, even against cor-
porate directors, belong to the corporation itself,'5 ' the decision
whether and to what extent to explore and to prosecute such
claims lies within the business judgment of the board of direc-
tors. 5 2 Like other questions of corporate policy and manage-
ment, the decision to dismiss a claim involves weighing and
balancing a variety of factors to determine what course of ac-
tion or inaction best advances the interests of the corporation
and its shareholders.153 These decisions are the very kind of
decisions that directors are required to make, and courts, there-
fore, should not "intrude to interfere.' 5 4 In addition, courts
may lack the training or expertise necessary to pass judgments
on complex business decisions.155
The authorization of a special litigation committee to re-
view derivative suits reflects a clear trend in the federal
courts. 56 In Abbey v. Control Data Corp.,157 for example, the
147. See Swanson v. Traer, 249 F.2d 854, 859 (7th Cir. 1957). Moreover,
courts generally assume that directors act honestly. See Note, The Demand and
Standing Requirements in Stockholder Derivative Actions, 44 U. Cim L. REV.
168, 192 (1976).
148. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
149. See MUNN. STAT. § 302A.201 (Supp. 1981).
150. See Note, supra note 130, at 621. See also Holmes v. St. Joseph Lead
Co., 84 Misc. 278, 283, 147 N.Y.S. 104, 107 (1914) (quoting Gamble v. Queens
County Water Co., 123 N.Y. 91, 99, 25 N.E. 201, 208 (1890)).
151. See Warner v. E.C. Warner Co., 226 Minn. 565, 569, 3 N.W.2d 721, 724
(1948).
152. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000-01, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. See Note, supra note 130, at 621.
156. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778, 781 (8th Cir. 1979);
Note, supra note 130, at 630. See also Burks v. Lasker, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Gen-
zer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Gall v. Exxon Corp., 418
F. Supp. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994,
419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
157. 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980).
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Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
of a shareholder's derivative suit pursuant to a litigation com-
mittee's finding that the suit did not serve the best interests of
the corporation.'5 8 The suit alleged violations of the securities
laws stemming from illegal foreign payments made by several
directors and officers of Control Data. The corporation estab-
lished a special litigation committee to investigate the charges.
After determining that the suit was not in the best interest of
the corporation, the committee directed counsel to move for
summary judgment. On appeal, the district court refused to
substitute its opinion for that of the special litigation commit-
tee and affirmed the grant of Control Data's motion. 5 9 Simi-
larly, in Lewis v. Anderson16 0 the Ninth Circuit held that "the
good-faith exercise of business judgment by a special litigation
committee of disinterested directors is immune to attack by
shareholders or the courts."161
Some courts and commentators, however, question the pro-
priety of allowing a committee appointed by the board of direc-
tors to terminate shareholder's derivative suits brought against
members of the board of directors.162 These authorities suggest
that directors will hesitate to recommend a suit against fellow
directors with whom they work and socialize, and question
whether a corporate litigation committee, appointed by the di-
rectors of a corporation, can ever be objective and unbiased in
reviewing the alleged wrongdoing of directors.163 In the recent
158. Id. at 727.
159. Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 460 F. Supp. 1242, 1246 (D. Minn. 1978).
The court found that the business judgment rule applied to committee dismis-
sal of shareholder derivative suits. Id. at 1245. The court went on to quote with
approval Justice Brandeis's concurrence in Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley
Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 343 (1936). "Mere belief that corporate action, taken or con-
templated, is illegal gives the [shareholder] no greater right to interfere than is
possessed by any other citizen. Stockholders are not guardians of the public.
The function of guarding the public against acts deemed illegal rests with pub-
lic officials." 460 F. Supp. at 1246.
160. 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979).
161. Id. at 783. The court characterized the application of the "business
judgment doctrine" as essentially an issue of standing. If the doctrine is appli-
cable, then the plaintiffs have no standing to sue. Id.
162. See infra notes 163-64 and accompanying text.
163. See Dent, supra note 140, at 109-13 ("[T]he pressures on even nonim-
plicated directors are so great as to justify a conclusive presumption that they
cannot independently investigate and weigh the facts and reach a conclusion
that is in the best interest of the corporation."); Note, supra note 130, at 636-37
("An inside director's decision not to sue a fellow director may be influenced
by salary, promotion, fringe benefits, employee morale, and career considera-
tion."). See also Lasker v. Burkes, 567 F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'd, 441
U.S. 471 (1979).
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case of Maldonado v. Flynn,164 for example, the court declined
to defer to the recommendations of a litigation committee. In-
stead, the court held that the power to dismiss a shareholder's
derivative action, based on an alleged breach of fiduciary duty,
was not included in the powers of the board of directors to
manage the corporation.165 The court expressly limited its
holding, however, to cases involving a breach of fiduciary duty
on the part of directors. 6 6 Although Maldonado was re-
versed,1 67 the appellate court still reasoned that courts should
apply their own independent business judgment when deter-
mining whether to grant a litigation committee's motion to dis-
miss a derivative suit based on a director's breach of duty. 68
The Minnesota legislature, by enacting a statutory provi-
sion for the review of shareholder derivative suits by a litiga-
tion committee, apparently has determined that the advantages
of the business judgment rule outweigh its potential for abuse.
The legislature's determination is justified. Through the use of
a special litigation committee, corporations can effectively deal
with the potential abuses of strike suits. 69 In addition, the new
statute should benefit corporations faced with suits which, al-
though not malicious, are not in the best interests of the
corporation.
Many situations may arise in which director or litigation
committee dismissal of a derivative suit brought in good faith is
legitimately in the best interest of the corporation or its share-
holders. The prospects of a suit's success may be slim. Litiga-
tion costs may exceed any potential recovery.170 Unfavorable
or unwanted publicity may injure the corporation's reputation
164. 413 A.2d 1251 (DeL Ch.), appeal dismissed, 417 A.2d 278 (DeL Ch. 1980),
rev'd sub nom. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (DeL 1981).
165. 413 A.2d at 1257.
166. Id. at 1263.
167. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
168. Id. at 789. The court held that while an independent committee may
cause its corporation to file a pretrial motion to dismiss, the court should apply
a two-step test to the motion. First, the court should inquire into the indepen-
dence and good faith of the committee and the reasons supporting its conclu-
sion. If the court finds the committee was not independent or did not show
reasonable bases for its conclusions, the motion will be denied. Otherwise, the
court will take the second step and determine, applying its own independent
business judgment, whether the motion should be granted. Id. at 788-89.
169. According to the reporter's notes, the intent of the statute is to grant
corporations the ability to respond effectively to such suits. MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 302A.243 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
170. See Note, Corporations-The Stockholder's Independent Right to Sue.
Derivatively-Maldonado v. Flynn and Its Progeny, 29 U. KAN. L. REV. 135, 136
(1980).
1982] 1057
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
and cause a drop in the market price of its stock. Similarly, de-
rivative suits may demoralize management or distract it from
its duties, perhaps resulting in inefficiency and lower profits.
Finally, a corporation may simply prefer to apply its own inter-
nal sanctions to employee or director misconduct.171
Moreover, the fear that litigation committees simply will
dismiss all shareholder's derivative suits brought against mem-
bers of the board of directors is unfounded. The statute im-
poses significant limitations on the composition and
deliberations of a litigation committee. Under the new Act,
members of a litigation committee must be "disinterested."'7 2
To be disinterested an individual cannot be a defendant to the
derivative suit, and cannot have been threatened to be made a
defendant to the suit. 7 3 Directors may serve on a litigation
committee, but only if they own less than one percent of the
outstanding shares in the corporation. 174 The committee must
be independent, and cannot be subject to the control of the
board of directors.175 Finally, litigation committee decisions not
to sue must be made in "good faith," and the committee must
set forth specific business related reasons supporting its con-
clusion that the suit should be dismissed as being not in the
corporation's best interests. 76
Given these limitations, it is unlikely that a committee will
dismiss derivative suits involving legitimate shareholder griev-
ances. Moreover, the decision to dismiss a derivative suit is not
immune from judicial review. The new Act shields the deliber-
ations and conclusions of the committee only if its members
possess a disinterested independence and do not stand in a re-
lation that prevents an unprejudiced exercise of judgment. 77
Thus; a court may review and overturn a committee's determi-
nation if it is shown that the committee was not composed of
independent disinterested individuals.178 The statute only pre-
cludes reviewing courts from inquiring into the substantive de-
171. See, e.g., Maher v. Zapata, 490 F. Supp. 348, 350 (S.D. Tex. 1980).
172. MmN. STAT. § 302A.243 (Supp. 1981).
173, Id.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. See also MmN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.243 reporter's notes (West Supp.
1982). "Committees dismissing suits should be expected to set forth specific,
business-related reasons why the suit is not in the best interests of the corpo-
ration." Id.
177. See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 631, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1001, 419
N.Y.S.2d 920, 927 (1979).
178. Id.
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cision whether to pursue a claim, because this necessarily
involves weighing commercial, promotional, ethical, and fiscal
factors that are common to the resolution of most corporate
problems.179 Such decisions are best left to the business judg-
ment of a director-appointed committee. But courts may prop-
erly inquire into the adequacy and appropriateness of the
committee's investigative procedures and methodologies, since
these do not involve business decisions. 18 0 Cursory investiga-
tions that are shallow in scope or execution raise obvious ques-
tions of good faith 18 1 and are not shielded by Chapter 302A.
While according deference to the business judgment of di-
rector-appointed committee members, the limitation of judicial
review to an examination of the procedures, methodologies,
and potential interests of the committee also prevents judicial
review of committee decisions from becoming a vehicle for
strike suits. Although shareholders can litigate the procedural
aspects of a committee's decision to dismiss, the substantive
basis for the decision is immune from attack. The burden is on
the party opposing the committee's decision to make a prima
facie showing that the committee was not disinterested or in-
dependent, or that the decision was reached in bad faith.182
Thus, it will be difficult for strike suit plaintiffs to pursue frivo-
lous claims in court. In addition, the number of suits initiated
by attorneys motivated by the hope of recovering fees should
decline as the prospects for prevailing on the merits diminish.
Finally, because judicial review will not reach the substantive
basis of the claim, the cost of defending such an action is signif-
icantly decreased, thereby reducing the nuisance value of the
sUit.183
The authorization of a committee, empowered to dismiss
shareholder's derivative suits, is justified on both legal and
public policy grounds. The new Act enables corporations to
deal effectively with strike suits, by properly recognizing that
the decision to dismiss a derivative suit is within the manage-
rial prerogatives of the business's directors. In addition, by re-
quiring that the litigation committee's decision be made by
179. Id. at 663, 393 N.E.2d at 1002, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928.
180. Id. at 634, 393 N.E.2d at 1002-03, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 929.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See, e.g., Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1979);
Note, supra note 130, at 630.
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disinterested directors in good faith, the new Act adequately
protects the legitimate interests of shareholders.
V. FREEZE OUT MERGERS
The new Act allows corporations to engage in three types
of fundamental change: merger with another corporation, ex-
change of shares with another corporation, and transfer of as-
sets.184 The most important modification of any fundamental
change is the rejection of the "business purpose" doctrine de-
veloped in Delaware185 and apparently adopted in Minne-
sota.' 86 The language of the new Act expressly authorizes a
merger without an underlying business purpose: "Any two or
more corporations may merge, resulting in a single corporation,
with or without a business purpose ... .-"187
The business purpose doctrine developed in response to
the recent phenomenon of mergers designed to eliminate the
publicly-held equity interests of minority investors, namely,
"going private" mergers. 88 The rising stock prices of the bull
market of the 1960's induced many previously privately-held
corporations to seek public equity financing, or to "go pub-
lic."'189 The falling stock prices of the bear market of the 1970's
provided the majority shareholders of many publicly-held cor-
porations with an opportunity to regain sole ownership of the
corporation at a low cost.190 The majority shareholders' voting
power enabled them to force the publicly-held corporation to
merge into a corporation owned solely by the majority, with the
184. MINN. STAT. § 302A.601 (Supp. 1981).
185. Prior to any significant Delaware decisions, the federal courts at-
tempted to use section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j (1980), and Rule lob-5 of the Securities and Exchange Commission Regu-
lations, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1981), to graft a "business purpose" doctrine on
the federal securities laws. See Green v. Santa Fe Indus., 533 F.2d 1283 (2d Cir.
1976), rev'd, 430 U.S. 462 (1977); Marshel v. AFW Fabric Corp., 553 F.2d 1277 (2d
Cir.), vacated as moot, 429 U.S. 881 (1976); Bryan v. Block & Blevins Co., 343 F.
Supp. 1062 (N.D. Ga. 1972), affd on other grounds, 490 F.2d 563 (5th Cir. 1974);
Note, Seeking a Legal Basis for the Valid Corporate Purpose in Going Private
Mergers, 12 CREIGHToN L. Rmv. 629, 629, 634-636 (1979). This movement was
stopped when the United States Supreme Court, in Santa Fe Indus. v. Green,
430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977), eliminated federal securities laws as a basis for the
"business purpose" doctrine.
186. Minnesota arguably adopted the doctrine in the unreported district
court opinion in Bird v. Wirtz, affid on other grounds, 266 N.W.2d 166 (Minn.
1978). M Nr. STAT. ANN. § 302A.601 reporter's notes (West Supp. 1982).
187. MWm. STAT. § 302A.601(1) (Supp. 1981) (emphasis added).
188. Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 61 VA. L REv. 1019, 1019-21 (1975);
Note, supra note 185, at 629.
189. Brudney, supra note 188, at 1019.
190. Id.
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minority "frozen out" of equity participation in the new corpo-
ration and paid off in cash or debt securities.19' Under the busi-
ness purpose doctrine, a merger undertaken solely to eliminate
the interest of the minority shareholders is invalid for lack of
an underlying business purpose.192
Delaware, in Singer v. Magnavox Co.,193 was the first state
court to apply the doctrine. In Singer, North American Philips
Corporation had acquired, through a tender offer, approxi-
mately eighty-four percent of the outstanding common stock of
Magnavox. North American Philips then formed T.M.C. Devel-
opment Corporation and merged Magnavox into T.M.C., paying
all minority shareholders in cash and retaining sole equity
ownership of T.M.C. The plaintiffs, minority shareholders of
Magnavox, filed suit to nullify the merger on numerous
grounds, including an allegation of fraud based on the major-
ity's lack of a business purpose. 9 4 The Delaware Supreme
Court held that a merger must be based on a business purpose,
explaining that a desire to eliminate minority equity interests
does not meet that standard.195 The business purpose doctrine,
according to the court, is a logical consequence of the duty of
the majority shareholders to the minority.196
Elaborating on Singer, one commentator suggested that be-
cause the majority shareholders are subject to a fiduciary stan-
dard when dealing with the property of the minority, they may
not freeze out the minority without a legitimate business pur-
pose.19 7 Such a freeze-out inevitably will damage the minority's
interest. 98 The notion that minority shareholders are harmed
in every freeze-out merger stems from a recognition that mi-
nority shareholders have an interest in both the form and the
value of their investment. 9 9 In Singer, for example, the court
rejected the majority's argument that it had satisfied its fiduci-
191. Such a merger may be accomplished by the use of a "shell" corpora-
tion or by a parent-subsidiary transaction. Brudney, supra note 188, at 1020.
192. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 980 (Del. 1977).
193. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977); see supra note 185.
194. 380 A.2d at 972.
195. Id. at 980. Singer involved a long form merger. In Roland Int'l Corp. v.
Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979), the Delaware court extended the business pur-
pose doctrine to encompass short form mergers.
196. 380 A.2d at 976.
197. McBride, Delaware Corporate Law: Judicial Scrutiny of Mergers-The
Aftermath of Singer v. The Magnavox Company, 33 Bus. LAw. 2231, 2233 (1978).
198. Id.
199. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d at 977-78; Note, Fairness in Freeze Out
Transactions, 69 Ky. L.J. 77, 99 (1980); see Note, Elimination of Minority Share
Interest by Merger: A Dissent, 54 Nw. U.L. REv. 629 (1960). 4:
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ary duty by offering a fair price for the minority shareholders'
interest.200 The court also stressed that the terms of the
merger were inadequate because no equity ownership in the
corporation was offered as a part of the minority's compensa-
tion.201 Thus, the Singer court rejected the common law rule
that the minority shareholders were harmed only if the value of
their investments was confiscated. 202
Subsequent Delaware decisions2 03 have affirmed the use of
the business purpose test, as have courts in Indiana,20 4 New
York205 and other jurisdictions. 2 06 Although none of these
opinions have adequately defined the term "business pur-
pose, '20 7 the requirement suggests that the purpose must be le-
gitimate or bona fide.20 8 Significantly, courts assessing the
legitimacy of a purported business purpose do not treat the
business judgment of the directors with as much deference as
they accord it in other areas of corporate law.2 09 Moreover, the
courts are not clear on exactly whose business purpose satis-
fies the test. In one instance, the Delaware court upheld a
merger in furtherance of the business purpose of the majority
shareholder.210
200. Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d at 977.
201. Id.
202. See Coyne v. Park & Tilford Distillers Corp., 73 Del. Ch. 558, 146 A.2d
785, 789 (1958), cffld, 38,Del. 514, 154 A.2d 893 (1959) (example of common law
position); McBride, supra note 197, at 2235.
203. Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032, 1034 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v. In-
ternational Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 395 (Del. Ch. 1978); Young v. Valhi, Inc.,
382 A.2d 1372, 1376 (DeL Ch. 1978).
204. Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 388, 370 N.E.2d 345, 356 (1977) (court
refused to specifically accept Singer but held that a merger must have a valid
business purpose).
205. The decisions of the New York courts indicate a movement toward a
business purpose standard. Note, An Apologyfor the Unwanted Public Share-
holder: The Business Purpose Test and the Freeze-Out Merger, 4 J. CoRp. L. 97,
116-17 (1978); see Clark v. Pattern Analysis Recognition Corp., 87 Misc.2d 385,
384 N.Y.S.2d 660 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Schuwolf v. Cerro Corp., 86 Misc.2d 292, 380
N.Y.S.2d 957 (Sup. Ct. 1976); People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 83 Misc. 2d 120, 371
N.Y.S.2d 550 (Sup. Ct. 1975).
206. See Note, supra note 199, at 102-03.
207. Note, supra note 205, at 117; Note, Short-Form Merger in Missouri: Po-
tential Problems For Minority Shareholders, 46 Mo. L. REV. 195, 222 (1981).
208. See Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382, 395 (Del. Ch.
1978).
209. See Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 979 (Del. 1977); see also supra
text accompanying notes 177-82 for a discussion of the business judgment rule
as applied to review of shareholder's derivative suits by special litigation
committees.
210. In Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1978), the
parent merged a wholly owned subsidiary into a subsidiary of which it owned
81%, eliminating minority shareholder's interests. Using Singer as its basis,
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The new Act rejects the business purpose doctrine. The
business purpose doctrine seems to require a court to examine
the facts and circumstances of each case,211 since "it is clear
that [a] business purpose which is sufficient to justify some
mergers may not be sufficient in different circumstances." 212
The uncertainty associated with the judicial review of mergers
has increased their cost and has possibly chilled some going-
private transactions.213 Chapter 302A avoids these undesirable
effects by eliminating the business purpose requirement.214
Moreover, the rejection of the business purpose doctrine and
the underlying fiduciary duty of majority shareholders is in ac-
cord with the new Act's overall goal of decreased interference
in corporate management.215 The new Act recognizes that the
majority shareholders fulfill their duty to the minority if the
majority offers the minority a fair price for their shares. Be-
cause the scope of the majority's fiduciary duty is thus limited
to the price offer for the minority's shares, appraisal is the only
available remedy under the new Act for an unfair price.216
Commentators have argued that the real danger to minor-
ity shareholders in a merger is that they may receive an inade-
quate price for their interest.217 Nevertheless, although they
argue that an inadequate price is the major danger, they reject
the court upheld the freeze out merger because the elimination of the minority
interests facilitated long term debt financing for the parent corporation. Id. at
387.
211. McBride, supra note 197, at 2246-50.
212. Id. at 2249.
213. Note, supra note 185, at 652-53 n.179 (citing Brudney, supra note 188,
Singer, and other authorities).
214. MIN. STAT. § 302A.601(1) (Supp. 1981).
215. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
216. 'The remedy for lack of 'entire fairness' in the transaction in this act is
the appraisal section; by obtaining the fair value of the shares, the dissenting
minority shareholder recoups the investment." MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.601 re-
porter's notes (West Supp. 1982). Appraisal proceedings are available to share-
holders who dissent from a "plan of merger to which the corporation is a
party." MiNN. STAT. § 302A.471(1) (c) (Supp. 1981). Upon proper notice from the
dissenting shareholder or after the merger takes effect, the corporation must
remit the fair value of the dissenting shareholder's interest. Id. § 302A.473(5).
The dissenter must then demand any supplemental payment due to an im-
proper determination of fair value by the corporation. Id. § 302A.473(6). If the
corporation and dissenting shareholder do not agree on the fair value, the dis-
senter may petition the court for a valuation. In that valuation, the court is free
to "determine the fair value of the shares, taking into account any and all fac-
tors the court finds relevant, computed by any method or combination of meth-
ods that the court, in its discretion, sees fit to use." Id. § 302A.473(7).
217. See Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freeze Outs, 87
YALE L.J. 1354, 1361, 1364, 1368 (1978), Note, supra note 205, at 101.
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the utility of appraisal as the sole remedy.218 Moreover, they re-
ject the use of the business purpose test as a measure of the
fairness or validity of the mdrger.219 In a merger involving a
large, publicly-held corporation with numerous small minority
interests, this assessment is probably correct-the possibility
of an inadequate price is the primary danger.2 20 Such investors
generally are indifferent regarding the form of the compensa-
tion they receive if the value of their investment is conserved.
These investors would remain indifferent to the results of a
freeze-out merger, provided that the majority paid a fair price
for the investment and another investment with an equal or
greater return was available.
Some considerations, however, may make the form of the
compensation important to investors.221 Federal and state in-
come taxes may affect the net value that the minority share-
holders receive. Although the exchange of shares completing
the merger is tax free to the majority, the payment of cash and
debt securities to the minority may well be a realization of in-
come and thus a taxable event.222 Even if the majority pays the
full value of the minority interest, the minority may be at a
short-run disadvantage due to these tax consequences. In addi-
tion, minority investors in a closely held corporation may lose
the less tangible values of an interest in the investment.2 23
Under the new Act, the minority investor in a closely-held cor-
poration may be frozen out and left in the same position as a
minority investor in a publicly-held corporation, with appraisal
218. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 217, at 1368.
219. Id. at 1368, 1376.
220. But see Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 n.8 (Del. 1977) (citing
Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Cal. Super. Ct. C-. 000268 (Nov. 19, 1975), in which the
court listed some of the stakes involved in an investor beyond the simple in-
vestment value).
221. Note, Corporate Freezeouts: A New Limitation Imposed by the "Entire
Fairness" Standard, 1978 U. IiL. L.F. 686, 698-9. One possible loss to the minor-
ity shareholders is the expense and risk of finding alternate investments.
Brudney, supra note 188, at 1023. Another loss to the minority is the "synergis-
tic gain" accruing to the majority by virtue of the economies of only having one
corporation (as in a parent-subsidiary merger) or no longer having to file re-
ports as a publicly-held corporation. Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 217, at
1371-1375 (citing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 552 F.2d 1239 (7th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 922 (1977)).
222. See LR.C. § 354(a) (1) (1976); Note, supra note 221, at 698 n.85.
223. See Note, supra note 199, at 99 (supporting an analytical distinction be-
tween publicly and closely held corporations); Note, Corporate Freeze-Outs Ef-
fected by Merger, The Search for a Rule, 37 U. Prrr. L. REV. 115, 130 (1975)
(same).
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as the sole remedy.224 The conversion of the minority interest
to cash may deprive shareholders of a proprietary interest in
the corporation or force them to part with an investment with
other sentimental value.225
The business purpose doctrine afforded minority share-
holders some protection from these otherwise uncompensated
losses. Although the rejection of the doctrine will result in less
interference in the internal affairs of the corporation,226 a por-
tion of the protection afforded to minority shareholders is no
longer available.227 The net value of the rejection of the busi-
ness purpose doctrine depends on the magnitude of interfer-
ence in corporate affairs compared with the magnitude of the
harm caused by the decreased protection for minority
shareholders.
The rejection of the business purpose doctrine should en-
tail significant gains for the business community. To that ex-
tent, the statute is a desirable development. The application of
the doctrine was too uncertain to be a useful guide to business
activity. The decreased protection afforded minority sharehold-
ers by the new Act, however, mandates that the courts pay
careful attention to the value paid to holders of minority inter-
ests. 228 In the absence of judicial attitudes encouraging liberal
valuations for the shareholders opting for appraisal, the overall
effect of the rejection of the business purpose doctrine will be
to unduly increase the power of majority shareholders in deal-
ings with the minority.
VI. CONCLUSION
Chapter 302A represents a reasonable accommodation of
224. The new Act applies identically to both closely and publicly held corpo-
rations. ADVISORY COmi. REP., supra note 3, at VIII.
225. See Jutkowitz v. Bourns, Cal. Super. Ct. C.A. 000268 (Nov. 19, 1975),
cited in Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969, 977 n.8 (Del. 1977).
226. See supra notes 214-16 and accompanying text.
227. The business purpose doctrine does not provide direct protection
against an inadequate offer price for the shares of the minority. In Tanzer, the
court spoke of an "entire fairness" approach in which the price was only a fac-
tor in the court's determination of fairness. 402 A.2d 382, 387-89 (Del. Ch. 1978).
228. A liberal valuation in appraisal proceedings is one possible solution to
the problem of uncompensated losses. The problems associated with uncom-
pensated tax consequences or intangible losses make a more specific guide im-
practicable. Although different shareholders have different problems, policies
of equity demand that those minority shareholders in the same merger with
holdings of similar size receive the same amount. In the final analysis, the only
proper admonition is that courts make liberal valuations cognizant of the disad-
vantages inherent in the minority shareholder's position.
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the state's interest in regulating corporate activity and the re-
quirements of corporate self-governance. The new Act has re-
formed corporate law by eliminating many of the unnecessary
formalities associated with corporate formation, governance,
merger, and dissolution. Moreover, the new Act provides cor-
porate management with much needed flexibility while protect-
ing shareholders from the most blatant abuses of corporate
power. In its sections on merger and special litigation commit-
tees, the new Act correctly recognizes that the directors, rather
than the shareholders or the courts, are best able to make deci-
sions concerning the management of the corporations. Never-
theless, the new claim bar and buy-out provisions should help
to protect shareholder's legitimate interests in receiving a fair
and certain return on their investments. By incorporating
these and other revisions, the new Act makes Minnesota law
more responsive to the realities of contemporary business
practices.
